TanStack Blog company blog

Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

by Tanner Linsley tanstack.com published 2026-05-11

On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on npm. Full postmortem.

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Security & PrivacySoftware Engineering2026

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