Cross-Site Request Forgery is dead
After toiling with Cross-Site Request Forgery on the web for, well forever really, we finally have a proper solution, it's Same-Site Cookies.
Hi, I'm Scott Helme, a Security Researcher, Entrepreneur and International Speaker. I'm the creator of Report URI and Security Headers, and I deliver world renowned training on Hacking and Encryption.
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After toiling with Cross-Site Request Forgery on the web for, well forever really, we finally have a proper solution, it's Same-Site Cookies.
A little while back I wrote a blog post about how "CSRF is dead". It focused on SameSite cookies, a powerful yet simple feature to protect your website against CSRF attacks. As powerful as it was, and as much as it will kill CSRF, you had to enable it on
We've identified 15,579 websites that are currently infected with malicious JavaScript and between them, we conservatively estimate that they receive more than 135 million visits every month. We know they're infected, and we have the evidence to back that up, but there's a problem: how on
HTTP Public Key Pinning is a very powerful standard that allows a host to instruct a browser to only accept certain public keys when communicating with it for a given period of time. Whilst HPKP can offer a lot of protection, it can also cause a lot of harm too.
In this blog I look at how widespread the usage of common security based HTTP response headers are in the Alexa Top 1 Million most visited sites.